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COMMENTARY ON JUDICIAL ETHICS
GEORGE EDWARDS*
UDICIAL ethics is a topic which covers a host of subjects, ranging
from corrupt practices and conflict of interests through avoidance
of appearance of evil to such matters as personal dignity and taste.
For most states and the federal jurisdiction1 the recorded standards
of judicial ethics are the Canons of judicial Ethics of the American
Bar Association. These 36 observations on judicial conduct are inter-
esting; but they are also vague and cloudy in wording. The Canons
raise about as many questions as they answer.
Some of this imprecision comes from the nature of the topic. Many
positive statements can be made about corruption and conflict of in-
terest. But the private life and personal conduct of judges is in many
respects as much a matter of taste for judges as for the average citizen.
And, of course, judges too value privacy. Probably part of the reason
that few judges choose to talk or write about judicial ethics - is that
to do so may be taken as an invitation for criticism of the judge's
own conduct, views or taste. No such invitation is intended here, but
the importance of the topic warrants risk.
TiE FORTAS MATTER
No episode in history has done more damage to public confidence
in the federal judiciary than the Fortas matter. Fortas was a Supreme
Court Justice and within a hairsbreadth of being its Chief Justice.
Then came the revelation that he had signed a contract for services
(for his and his wife's lifetimes) for $20,000 a year with the Wolfson
Family Foundation controlled and financed by a man who was (but
obviously then hoped he wouldn't be) on his way to the federal pen-
itentiary. The stipulated quid for the $20,000 per year quo was to be
service to laudable public purposes. And when the indictment of Wolf-
son became certain, Fortas voided the contract and returned the first
$20,000. He said he did so because the Supreme Court workload made
the foundation work impossible.
On the known facts, no one found a law that Fortas had violated.
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
1. Many states have adopted the Canons by rule. The Federal jurisdiction appears to
recognize them in judicial decisions and with occasional variations by resolutions of the
U.S. judicial Conference.
2. For a notable exception, see Sobeloff, Striving for Impartiality in the Federal Courts,
24 Fed. BJ. 286 (1964), to which I acknowledge indebtedness.
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And aside from a stricture against "impropriety," one can search the
Canons of Judicial Ethics in vain to find a clear prohibition which
fitted the matter. Fortas never sat on any Wolfson case, and if Wolfson
was seeking influence, it was probably administrative rather than ju-
dicial influence. Nonetheless, the public shock and dismay over this
financial arrangement between a convict-to-be and a Supreme Court
Justice compelled a sudden resignation.'
Against this background, the United States Judical Conference hastily
adopted a resolution proscribing all paid outside activities of federal
judges without prior approval of their Judicial Councils and calling
for somewhat limited disclosure of federal judges' assets and incomes.4
Now the American Bar Association has called for revision of its Canons.
There is no doubt that stricter standards are in the making, as has
been vividly illustrated in the Senate battle over Fortas' successor. In
this context discussion of some of the more important concepts of
judicial ethics seems appropriate.
It should be noted that the first three of the standards are phrased as
clear prohibitions, while the last three are phrased affirmatively to recog-
nize the wide range of judgment which may be involved. Of course, no
six sentence summary of this topic can be complete, but it will serve to
supply topic headings.
Six BASIC CONCEPTS
1) A judge's decision is a public trust and must never be for sale.
2) A judge must not decide cases which involve financial gain or
loss to him.
3) A judge must not use his position for private gain for himself
or for his family.
4) A judge should avoid the appearance of evil-even when evil
is not present.
5) In his private life and activities a judge should never demean
or exploit his office.
6) A judge's decision should reflect the law as his knowledge and
conscience hold it to be, and not the pressures of the moment, whether
from press or politics or public passion.
3. Ludvigsen, Impeachment, The Detroit News, May 13, 1969, at 5B, col. 3; Graham,
The Fortas Puzzle: What Was the Flaw?, The N.Y. Times, May 18, 1969, at 1E, col. S.
4. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Guide to the Administrative
Organization of the United States Courts XVIII-7 (Oct. 1969). (At the October 31, 1969,
session of the Judicial Conference, the control on outside activity in this resolution was
"suspended" pending the ABA revision of The Canons of judicial Ethics.)
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A Judicial Decision Is a Public Trust Which Must
Never Be For Sale
"The place of justice is a hallowed place; and therefore not only
the bench, but the foot-pace and precincts and purprise thereof ought
to be preserved without scandal and corruption."'
Canon 4. Avoidance of Impropriety
A judge's official conduct should be free from impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety; he should avoid infractions of law; and his personal behavior, not only
upon the Bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday
life, should be beyond reproach.
In 35 years of more or less gainful employment, I have known a wide
range of occupational groups, both public and private. Comparatively
speaking, the judges with whom I have worked during nearly 18 of
these years on four different courts have been a sober, frugal, indus-
trious and conscientious group. I do not mean to suggest that the ju-
diciary has a corner on all virtues. For example, although there are
exceptions, I would not rate the judiciary quite so highly on a compara-
tive scale as to such qualities as humor, imagination or social vision.
But the indicia of the rogue--big spending, hard drinking, fast driving
and high living-are notably absent. And the virtue of dollar honesty
tends to be taken for granted. I believe that corruption is rare among
judges-much more rare than it is among legislative and administrative
officials in the public sector, or among corporate or labor executives in
the private sector. But, of course, it should be.
Indeed, the principle that a judge must not sell his judgments is now
regarded as so obvious that the Canons of Judicial Ethics does not
contain a line which deals directly with corruption. No doubt judicial
sale of a decision would be an "impropriety" under Canon 4 above.
And, of course, there are federal and state criminal statutes squarely
prohibiting such conduct so that the stricture against violations of the
law would likewise apply.
Historically, it is interesting to note that Sir Francis Bacon, who
wrote the first major treatise in English law on judicial ethics, "Of
Judicature," and who is quoted in the ABA's Canons of Judicial Ethics,
admitted receiving substantial gifts from litigants in cases before him.0
Although this practice was widely condoned in Elizabethan England,
it resulted in Bacon's conviction for bribery and his imprisonment in
the Tower of London.
5. F. Bacon, Of Judicature, in Bacon's Essays 140 (F. G. Selby ed. 1962).
6. Bond, The Growth of Judicial Ethics, 10 Mass. L.Q. 1, 8-9 (1925).
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At least one historian suggests that the first United States Supreme
Court decided cases in which one or more of its members had substan-
tial interests.7
In the history of the federal judiciary there have been a total of
four judges found guilty as a result of impeachment procedures. One
was convicted for drunkenness, one for supporting secession, and two
on charges which involved corrupt practices." But it should be added
that in a number of other instances impeachment was avoided or
terminated by resignations.9
In the most notorious case of these, Senior Circuit Judge Martin
Manton, of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, was convicted of
conspiracy to violate federal antibribery statutes. Most of the cases
concerned were patent cases involving large sums of money. The princi-
pal conduit was an intimate friend of Manton's-William J. Fallon.
Manton's astonishing record of infidelity was summarized thus by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals' panel which affirmed his conviction,
with two Supreme Court Justices, Sutherland and Stone, sitting as Cir-
cuit Justices:
It is enough to say that, if believed by the jury, as we may properly assume it was,
it [the evidence] discloses a state of affairs so plainly at variance with the claim
of Manton's innocence as to make the verdict of the jury unassailable. The circum-
stances taken altogether amply sustain that conclusion. Among these circumstances
the following are especially significant: (a) The long and friendly relations between
Fallon and Manton. (b) The employment of Fallon in obtaining loans for the
Manton corporations. (c) The apparently gratuitous introduction by Fallon to
Manton of persons interested in cases while they were under consideration or
pending. (d) Lotsch's testimony that after being introduced by Fallon he paid to
Manton $10,000 ostensibly for the corruption of Judge Thomas, received from Man-
ton a trial brief of the government in that case, consulted with him about the lan-
guage of an opinion before it was handed down, was advised to leave New York
because of an investigation then in progress or threatened, was admonished to keep
secret the Thomas matter, and that Manton, after being told, upon inquiry by him,
the date when a particular transaction had occurred, said it was barred by the
statute of limitations. (e) Manton's relations with Reilly, their telephone conversa-
tions, in which Manton expressed anxiety about Fallon's being carried on the payroll
because of a pending investigation, Manton's suggestion that the circumstance would
be embarrassing to him and that the record pages relating to the matter should be
pulled out, that certain records be destroyed because of the Art Metal investigation,
and that the statute of limitations would protect them in that investigation. (f) The
7. G. Myers, History of the Supreme Court of the United States 273 (1925).
8. 12 Encyclopedia Britannica 2J (1969).
9. "55 judges have been the subject of Congressional inquiry; 8 were impeached [as
noted above, 4 of these were found guilty], 17 resigned during the investigation, 8 were
censured by a Congressional committee (Congress has no official power of censure), and
the rest were absolved." Footlick, Reformers Seek to Cleanse Courts of Unfit Judges, The
National Observer, Feb. 28, 1966, at 14, col. 2.
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manipulation of the schedule of assignments of judges to enable Manton to sit in
the Schick case. (g) The loans made at Manton's request by or through the inter-
vention of persons interested in some of the cases during their pendency, one of the
most significant of these being the loan of $25,000 made in the name of Sullivan by
Lotsch to Manton at the latter's solicitation on the very day of the argument in the
General Motors case, the proceeds of which were immediately handed by Sullivan
to Manton, a method adopted to conceal Manton's connection with the transaction.
Similar technique appears in respect of the loans made by Andrews to or for cor-
porations in which Manton was interested through Spector as a conduit .... "10
For some, all of this will seem useless repetition of ancient history.
But in this decade three justices of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
were removed from the Bench for corrupt sale of decisions." And this
very year the Chief Justice and an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of Illinois resigned after a special investigating commission had
charged them with judicial "improprieties" in the acceptance of bank
stock while a criminal case concerning a man who was deemed to be
the source of the stock was pending before the Supreme Court of Il-
linois.'
Of course, these dramatic examples must be balanced against a federal
judiciary which has numbered over 2,0001 and an estimated total of over
50,000" state court judges since this country was founded. But, so long
as judgeships must be manned by human beings, the possibility of cor-
ruption exists.
It may be useful to define the areas of greatest concern. I believe
them to be the criminal prosecutions involving organized crime (in-
cluding labor racketeering) and corporate litigation where exceedingly
large sums of money depend upon the outcome.
Organized crime makes corruption a potential problem in all big
city criminal courts. If organized crime can find vulnerable officials
in or outside the courts, on or off the bench, there is every reason to
believe that it will take advantage of the opportunity. And, unfortu-
10. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 843-44 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 309
US. 664 (1940).
11. Note, Courts: Scandal in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 20 Ok a. L. Rev. 417 (1967).
12. The Detroit News, Aug. 1, 1969, at 9D, col. 3-4.
13. This estimate was made by the Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts after an analysis of Surrency, Federal District Court Judges and
the History of Their Courts, 40 F.R.D. 139 (1967). Letter from William E. Foley to Judge
George Edwards, Oct. 24, 1969.
14. Judicial statistics in the 50 states are generally in a somewhat chaotic state. This
estimate is based on the assumption that there are now over 15,000 state judges (Footlick,
Reformers Seek to Cleanse Courts of Unfit Judges, The National Observer, Feb. 28, 1966 at 1,
col. 6) and employs the ratio (1 to 3-1/3) produced by relating the present federal judiciary
to the total number of federal judges since the founding of the country.
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nately, some businessmen are likewise convinced that money can buy
anything.
The other two identifiable areas of concern are bankruptcy receiver-
ship proceedings and probate proceedings involving the administration
of the estates of deceased persons. In these matters there frequently
are cases where substantial sums of money are at issue and there is
no one who has a claim which warrants his serving as a jealous guardian
of it. In addition, these cases can, and occasionally do, involve judicial
patronage which may adversely affect judicial impartiality.
A JUDGE MUST NOr DEcIDE CAsEs WHICH INVOL.VE
FINANCIAL GAIN OR LOSS To Him
Canon 26. Personal Investments and Relations
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are
apt to be involved in litigation in the court; and, after his accession to the Bench,
he should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient
to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should,
so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to
arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his
impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties.
Canon 29. Self-Interest
A judge should abstain from performing or taking part in any judicial act in
which his personal interests are involved. If he has personal litigation in the court
of which he is judge, he need not resign his judgeship on that account, but he should,
of course, refrain from any judicial act in such a controversy.
Obviously a judge should not hear and decide a case where the out-
come would either enrich him or cause him financial loss. Such a situa-
tion would provide the classic "conflict of interest" case. Whatever
standards may have been in past history, no one now suggests that
where the possibility of gain or loss is substantial, the judge has any
choice other than to disqualify himself. But as Canon 26 above infers,
many (probably most) judges do have some personal investments, and
the possibility that those investments might at some time be involved
in litigation before the judge's court is a real one.
Most judges come to the bench relatively late in life. Like most
American citizens of similar age in this affluent society they are likely
to have accumulated savings-and possibly some inheritance. Such funds
represent a major aspect of their families' security. They may also repre-
sent an important factor in the judge's own judicial independence. As
of now, it seems clear to me that judges are free to keep such funds and
to invest them. If public policy were to decree otherwise, present salary
and pension plans in most states (and the inadequate widows' pension
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scheme in the federal system!) would have to be revised drastically
upward to prevent a sharp decrease of qualified candidates for judicial
office.
Assuming continuation of present policy, I think that a judge should
seek to avoid investments which offer a likelihood of involvement in
litigation in his own court. And I think a judge should disqualify him-
self in any case where he (or his wife or minor children) possesses a
substantial interest in a litigant party.
A standard for the federal bench is provided by statute: "Any jus-
tice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case
in which he has a substantial interest . .. ."I' It might, however, be
supposed from the language of Canon 29 quoted above, "A judge
should [not sit where] his personal interests are involved," that any
stock interest in a company involved in litigation, no matter how minis-
cule the holding might be, should automatically disqualify the judge.
Thus far neither the American Bar Association Committee which in-
terprets the Canons of Ethics nor the courts have accepted that inter-
pretation. In a much quoted case, a United States District Judge said:
After the motion papers and briefs were filed, I discovered for the first time that
the Radio Corporation of America is one of the defendants. For some years I have
owned twenty shares of the common stock of that corporation, which posed the ques-
tion of my possible duty to impose disqualification to deal with this motion, in view
of Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 ....
I have ascertained that the Radio Corporation of America has issued 13,881,016
shares of no par common stock. My interest, therefore, would be represented by the
fraction of 20/13,881,016. I do not see how, by any process of reasoning, that could
be regarded as a 'substantial interest' in the controversy, which would justify me
in avoiding responsibility by disqualifying myself under the statute.
To guard against error in holding this view, I notified both attorneys in writing, of
the stockholding in question, and have been assured by a letter from the plaintiff's
attorney that he and his adversary have agreed to request that I decide the motion,
and this has been construed as a waiver of any possible statutory objection. 10
I think that Judge Byers handled his problem with great care and
that any other decision on his part might have been an imposition on
some other judge who probably had heavy trial responsibilities of his own.
In discussing this same problem, Judge Sobeloff said: "A judge with
a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case or owning property
that will be affected by a suit over which he presides should disqualify
himself. If, however, the interest is slight and remote, he is not dis-
qualified."'7
15. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1964).
16. Lampert v. Hollis Music, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3, 5-6 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
17. Sobeloff, supra note 2, at 291.
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Justices of State Supreme Courts have about the worst of the dis-
qualification problem. Not only do they have final authority pertaining
to a wide range of questions affecting litigants in their states, but in
addition, they generally sit en banc. In most states there is no replace-
ment for a judge. Every disqualification becomes public. And any
disqualification may itself affect (or determine) the outcome of the
case. During my term on the Supreme Court .of Michigan, we had oc-
casion to grapple with some of these problems, as have other justices
in other states.
In a Conference on Judicial Ethics at the University of Chicago,"
Justice Fairchild, then of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, quoted a
series of questions. 9 These questions had been inspired by the announce-
ment of the program and had been sent to Fairchild in advance by a
Justice from a Supreme Court of another state. The conference did
not answer the questions, but seemed to treat them as illustrative of the
principle that disqualification ultimately has to depend upon the good
conscience of the judge.
The questions from the anonymous justice follow, with my answers
in italics.
Q. "Are we limited to investments in Government bonds, real estate, other bonds?"
A. No.
Q. "Is even the latter if by private corporation permissible?"
A. If this question means are judges prohibited generally from investing in private
corporation bonds, I think the answer is "No."
Q. "Getting down to specific items, may a Supreme Court Judge own the following:
stock in AT&T; stock in General Motors; stock in a public utility operating in the
state; bonds of a county or school district of the state?"
A. A Justice of the Supreme Court should not own stock in any corporation in his
state where he has reasonable grounds to believe the corporation will be repeatedly
in litigation before his court on matters of wide general interest. This would seem to
me to rule out ownership of stock in AT&T or a public utility operating in his state
where appeals from the rate-making body were taken to the Supreme Court. Unless
there was some forewarning of a problem in relation to a county or school district
bond issue, I would see no reason for a judge to feel he could not invest in such
bonds. I think ownership of General Motors stock should be judged somewhat on the
same basis as outlined above. There are probably many states, although none with
which I am intimately familiar, where litigation in relation to this corporation is
relatively rare.
Q. "Should I sit in a case owning AT&T stock when the local Bell Telephone Com-
pany is up before us on a rate increase? [I think I know the answer to that onel]"
A. I think you do too.
18. The University of Chicago Law School, Conf. on Judicial Ethics (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Conf. on Judicial Ethics].
19. Judge Fairchild is now Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.
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Q. "May I, owning GM stock, sit in an action against a subsidiary of General
Motors, such as when Buick Motor Company is the defendant?"
A. Buick Motor is, of course, a wholly-owned division of General Motors. If the
judge's stockholding in GM was a substantial investment to him, I think, he should
not sit.
Q. "Should I sit where a bond issue is being challenged by a city or school district
if I own bonds issued by another district? . . ."
A. I see no reason not to, unless the question presented also affects the validity
of the bonds which the Justice owms. °
It must be obvious by now that it is frequently difficult in discussing
illustrations under this topic to know whether we are discussing avoid-
ing evil or avoiding the appearance of evil. This last difficult concept
we shall return to as the fourth topic under discussion.
This may be an appropriate point to warn that disqualification is
no simple solution to the problems of judicial ethics. The work load of
the courts at every level is very great-and is rapidly increasing. A
disqualification frequently delays the trial or hearing of a case. It al-
ways constitutes a burden upon another busy judge. In most cases of
moment and of public controversy, an assigned judge can think of some
reason why he would rather not sit. In routine cases the factor which
might be argued for disqualification may be concealed in a voluminous
record and have no decision-making weight at all. The judge who dis-
qualifies himself too often is likely to get the reputation of ducking his
basic responsibility for decision-making. And while many problems
concerning disqualification seem to me to have definite answers, there
will be some (and some of the most important) where only the judge
himself will ever really know whether he should or should not disqualify
himself. Usually this will be true when no litigant can point a finger--or
perhaps even make a guess.
Sometimes full disclosure in advance can avoid any need for disqual-
ification. When an apparent judicial interest in a case assigned to a
judge is not a real one, full disclosure to and prior decision by a disin-
terested judge, plus disclosure to the parties, may prove a means of
avoidance of needless disqualifications. The judges of my court (The
Sixth Circuit) usually consult the Chief Judge on problems which they
think might offer difficulties. If the Chief Judge thinks the problem
should be treated under the de minimis rule, the judge may then dis-
close the fact or relationship to the parties in court and offer to dis-
qualify himself if either party requests it. Waivers are generally (not
always) forthcoming. Senator Tydings has now proposed a bill which
would formalize this practice by requiring disclosure to the Chief Judge
20. Fairchild, Comment, Conf. on judicial Ethics 9, 14.
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(or Chief Justice) and requiring him to make a decision in writing on
the issue of substantiality of interest.2 I believe that such a decision
by the Chief Judge and its disclosure to the parties, without requiring
comment from them, might prove preferable to the waiver practice
outlined above which can prove embarrassing to lawyers.
Similarly, it seems to me that a judge should welcome reporting
his assets and income (and those of his immediate family) to an ap-
propriate body designated by the judiciary as provided in the United
States Judicial Conference resolution. If the reviewing panel saw po-
tential problems in a particular investment held by a judge, the problem
could and should be dealt with beforehand rather than after some
dispute arose. And if the reviewing panel saw no problem, the judge
would have that added independent weight behind his own judgment.
In relation to these matters (as in relation to regulation of "outside
activity") I would prefer action by the appropriate agency of the
judiciary to statutory enactments. If a rule produces an unforseen prob-
lem, it can more easily be amended than can a law.
And, of course, I share with most judges the hope that similar ethical
standards and controls will be adopted by the legislative and executive
branches of our government where we are inclined to believe the prob-
lems are more critical.
A JUDGE MUST NOT USE His POSITION FoR PRIVATE
GAIN FOR HIMSELF OR FOR His FAMILY
Canon 26. Personal Investment and Relations
He should not utilize information coming to him in a judicial capacity for purposes
of speculation; and it detracts from the public confidence in his integrity and the
soundness of his judicial judgment for him at any time to become a speculative in-
vestor upon the hazard of a margin....
Canon 32. Gifts and Favors
A judge should not accept any presents or favors from litigants, or from lawyers
practicing before him or from others whose interests are likely to be submitted to
him for judgment ...
Canon 13. Kinship or Influence
A judge should not act in a controversy where a near relative is a party; he should
not suffer his conduct to justify the impression that any person can improperly influ-
ence him or unduly enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by the kinship, rank, posi-
tion or influence of any party or other person.
The first two Canons quoted above (unlike some) are clear and need
no comment other than endorsement. The Canon on Kinship or Influence
21. S. 1506, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
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may warrant some discussion, since it frequently is pertinent in judicial
problem cases.
Joseph Borkin in The Corrupt Judge- has performed a service to
the judiciary if only by spelling out in intimate detail the techniques
of corruption. His book discusses three judges, of which Judge Manton
is the first. The last is Judge Albert W. Johnson, of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, about whom
Borkin writes:
Complaints about his official conduct started soon after he took the oath of office.
By 1931 the criticism had once again erupted into the press. Under attack was his
handling of bankruptcies and receiverships over which he had jurisdiction. An item
appearing in the Philadelphia Inquirer in May of 1931 revealed that since January,
of twenty bankruptcy cases in Lycoming County, Judge Johnson's son-in-law, Carl
Schug, had been appointed trustee in eleven. Notice was also taken that Judge John-
son's sons Donald and Albert, Jr., had been appointed in bankruptcy cases in other
counties. Of the seventy lawyers in Lycoming County, the administration of all the
bankruptcies had gone to only five.
The organization in 1931 of the Tea Springs Lodge added to the public dismay.
The judge and his sons enjoyed hunting and the outdoor life generally. The Tea
Springs Lodge helped them pursue this pleasure. Operated as a club, with a list of
seventy-four members, it nevertheless appeared to be the private preserve of the
judge and his sons. This does not mean that the rest of the members did not get their
money's worth for their $500 initiation fee plus annual dues. Fifty-one of them were
appointed by Judge Johnson in one form or another as appraisers, receivers, trustees,
attorneys for trustees, special masters, or referees in bankruptcy in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. Of the remaining twenty-three, eleven were ineligible for
such appointment by law. Judge Johnson, his three sons, and Judge J. Warren Davis
were among the ineligibles. In other words, 82 per cent of the dues-paying members
of the Tea Springs Lodge received appointments and fees by virtue of Judge John-
son's position as a Federal judge. According to court records, these payments came
to the grand total of $265,648. No wonder Judge Johnson's appointees permitted
the Tea Springs Lodge to be his private fief.P
The most astonishing of the episodes in Judge Johnson's career was
the receivership proceeding concerning the Williamsport Wire Rope
Company. Judge Johnson ultimately approved sale of this company to
Bethlehem Steel (then represented by Hoyt Moore of the Wall Street
law firm, Cravath, deGersdorff, Swaine & Wood) for $3,300,000, little
if any of which was available for payment to stockholders.
Federal investigation into this case disclosed splits of receivers' and
legal fees with two of Johnson's sons and an agreement for an unusual
$250,000 "administration expense" of which $223,000 was to be paid
by Bethlehem out of court.
Reviewing the entire record, the Judiciary Committee of the House
22. J. Borkin, The Corrupt judge (1962).
23. Id. at 143-44.
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of Representatives concluded that the Williamsport stockholders lost
their equity as a result of "the corrupt connivance of John Memolo,
attorney for the receivers; Hoyt A. Moore, attorney for Bethlehem
Steel Co.; Judge Johnson; and his son, Donald Johnson .... I'l
On suit by the stockholders, the sale was decreed void for fraud.
Bethlehem ultimately paid the stockholders of Williamsport $6 million
for a substitute consent decree. Under threat of impeachment, Judge
Johnson resigned, surrendering all salary and pension rights.
Active participation in business ventures, speculative investments,
favoritism toward relatives or friends have proved to be the downfall
of most of the judges who have been threatened with impeachment or
impeached.
A JUDGE SHOULD AvOID TH-E APPEARANCE OF EvIL-
EvEN WHEN EvI. IS NOT PRESENT
Such a generality has an infinitude of illustrations and provokes an
infinitude of opinions. No judge can possibly succeed in living by it to
everyone's complete satisfaction.
Former Federal Judge Simon Rifkind suggests that a judge should
not drink too much or be a too frequent standee at the betting windows
at the race track, and that his wife should not be the first to adopt the
most daring fashion. Frugality alone would commend all of these sug-
gestions to me and to my brethren. The same applies to judge Rifkind's
added thought that a judge should not be too conspicuous on the polo
field.2 5 (I find some satisfaction in the fact that he did not mention
tennis ! )
Aside from maintaining a reasonable decorum in his private conduct,
there are many instances where the judge should seek to avoid the ap-
pearance of evil on the bench. I came to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit from a two-year term as Police Commis-
sioner of the City of Detroit. For six years I have screened the briefs
and records of criminal appeals from Michigan to try to ascertain
whether or not during 1962 and 1963 any of the 4,500 officers of the
Detroit Police Department were involved in investigations which led
to the federal prosecutions in the appeals assigned to my panels. If
so, routinely I asked the Chief Judge to assign another judge or to
assign the case to another panel, even though in most if not all such
instances I had no recollection at all of the matter. The number of
such instances was embarrassing for several years. But since my court
24. H.R. Rep. No. 1639, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1946).
25. Rifkind, The Public Concern in a Judge's Private Life, Conf. on Judicial Ethics
25, 27.
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sits in panels of three judges, replacement is possible. My brethren were
cooperative and I think understood that regardless of my remoteness as
Police Commissioner from, say, a particular narcotics arrest, the de-
fendant would never be able to regard the head of the police force
which arrested him as imparial in the appeal of his conviction.
Recently I wrote an opinion reiterating this principle in relation to
a federal trial judge as to whom an appellant convicted of postal theft
alleged disqualification. The judge had formerly been United States
District Attorney when a preliminary hearing had been had in appel-
lant's case. He was appointed to the Bench long before appellant's trial.
He had never participated in or had any personal knowledge of the
charges against appellant. The applicable federal statute, however, reads
in part: "Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any case in which he ... has been of counsel ... ., Of
course, the United States District Attorney has responsibility for all
criminal prosecutions in his district27 and hence, is "of counsel."
The opinion said:
There are two plausible reasons for rejecting appellant's disqualification issue. The
first is that in actuality appellant had a fair trial before a judge who knew nothing
about his case except as the trial record developed before him. We recognize that this
jury case was well tried by an able and impartial judge. The trouble with this argu-
ment is that the language of the statute is mandatory: "Any... judge of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he ... has been of counsel ...."
(Emphasis added.) As to this feature of the statute, prejudice is presumed whether
actually present or not. We believe that the language employed by Congress compels
the conclusion that Congress was concerned with avoiding the appearance of partiality
as well as avoiding the fact.28 (Emphasis in originaL)
The next illustration reverts to the problems posed by judges' in-
vestments. For this example let us assume the judge had 100 shares of
stock in his (or his wife's) name in a large corporation. His investment
is worth $8,000 and it represents 1/100,000 of the value of the corpo-
ration. He is assigned to try a personal injury claim against that cor-
poration where $25,000 damages are asserted. Thus the judge might
have a financial interest of twenty-five cents in the outcome of the
suit. Disqualification here is clearly not compelled by any "substantial
interest" which the judge has in the outcome of the case. But I would
be inclined to argue that nonetheless he should seek to avoid deciding
that case. An investment of the size described is likely to be substantial
to the judge.29 It may mean some prior judgment on the part of the judge
26. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1964).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. IV, 1969).
28. United States v. Arnerine, 411 F.2d 1130, 1133 (6th Cir. 1969).
29. For examples of what constitutes a "substantial interest" see Bradford Audio Corp.
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concerning the management of the company, and if the holding has con-
tinued for some years, an opinion may have formed in relation to the
integrity of its operations. Of much more moment, however, is the fact
that the judge has to be concerned about appearance of partiality in situa-
tions where he may know that in fact no partiality exists. For the average
personal injury litigant, knowledge that the judge is a stockholder of the
corporation which he is engaged in suing would be sufficient to make him
sure that an adverse judicial verdict would be directly related to the fact
of the stock ownership. The loser will never take the trouble to make the
mathematical calculation above-nor will he believe it if it is made for
him.
The next illustration concerns a criminal case.
Once I stood at the back of a courtroom and heard a judge with
whom several of us had a luncheon appointment administer a sentence.
It was a long sentence for a serious crime. For all I knew (or know)
about the matter, it was wholly appropriate for the offense-and the
offender. Completing the sentence, the judge signaled the group of us
to join him in chambers. The recently sentenced man was still within
the bar of the courtroom, and his guard was engaged in handcuffing
him preparatory to the trip back to the county jail. As the judge greeted
us at the door of his chambers, he made a quip to one of my companions
about a topic of interest only to them and burst out in a deep belly
laugh that reverberated through the courtroom. The judge entered his
chambers without ever looking back. I did-and saw the look of bitter
hatred which the prisoner turned on the judge. The prisoner had obvi-
ously concluded that the judge had not only taken fifteen years of his
life, but had made a joke about it. What a background for a "correc-
tional" experience which society hopes will return that offender a "better
citizen" than he was when he went to the penitentiary.
Here, again, there was no evil, but the judge's lack of perception
created the appearance of it.
Canon 25 provides still another type of illustration of avoidance of
of evil appearance:
A judge should avoid giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he is
utilizing the power or prestige of his office to persuade or coerce others to patronize
or contribute, either to the success of private business ventures, or to charitable
enterprises. He should, therefore, not enter into such private business, or pursue
such a course of conduct, as would justify such suspicion, nor use the power of his
office or the influence of his name to promote the business interests of others; he
should not solicit for charities, nor should he enter into any business relation which,
v. Pious, 392 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1968); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Onl & Refining Co.,
;296 JF.2d 215 (Sth Cir. 1961).
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in the normal course of events reasonably to be expected, might bring his personal
interest into conflict with the impartial performance of his official duties.
Pursuant to this Canon, and appropriately, I think, the United States
Judicial Conference (and some State Supreme Courts) have forbidden
judges to serve as officers or directors of private corporations.
IN His PRIVATE LIFE AND ACTIVITIES A JUDGE SHOULD
NEVER DEMEAN OR EXPLOIT His OFFICE
Canon 33. Social Relations
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that a judge should
live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as reasonable attention to
the completion of his work will permit, he continue to mingle in social intercourse,
and that he should not discontinue his interest in or appearance at meetings of mem-
bers of the Bar. He should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him
be particularly careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to awaken the
suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in
influencing his judicial conduct.
Canon 34. A Summary of Judicial Obligation
In every particular his conduct should be above reproach. He should be con-
scientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless
of public clamor, regardless of public praise, and indifferent to private political or
partisan influences; he should administer justice according to the law and deal with
his appointments as a public trust; he should not allow other affairs or his private
interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his judicial duties,
nor should he administer the office for the purpose of advancing his personal ambitions
or increasing his popularity.
The truth of the matter is that, aside from the confines of his home,
a judge really has no truly private life. Everything he does is considered
by the public-not by its ordinary standard as to human conduct, but
by the public's much stricter standard as to what it thinks a judge
should or should not do. Those of us who choose the judiciary as a
vocation simply have to accept this as a fact of life and seek to avoid
excesses in conduct, including some which might be tolerated in other
occupations.
But in the wake of the Fortas affair, the most frequently uttered
comments (some by people who ought to know better) are ones which
infer that the ideal for a judge is to avoid all criticism. Such a standard
would certainly eliminate as judicial heroes such giants of our legal
history as Brandeis, Holmes, Frankfurter and Warren. I also venture
the suggestion that the quality of justice for this country's future would
be lowered by a judiciary which decided cases with an eye on the pos-
sibility of critical comment by press or some section of the public.
Mly suggestion that in his private life and activities a judge should
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never demean or exploit his office is meant to designate the outer pe-
rimeter of what has come to be termed "outside activities." Many things,
such as exploitation of a judge's power for financial gain, or political
advancement, or disgracing his office by public display of intemperance
seem to me to be undebatably beyond that perimeter.
In my first year on the Wayne County Circuit Bench, one of my
colleagues achieved considerable notoriety by parking his automobile at
the front door of a prominent downtown night spot in the early hours
of the morning. The story gained piquancy from the fact that he had
ignored the curb and parked on the public sidewalk. Someone remedied
the situation before any policeman arrived. But the affair (not his
first) resulted in a formal request from the Bench for the judge's re-
tirement-and his agreement.
Exploitation of judicial office for political purposes is forbidden by
Canons 28 and 30. Canon 30 specifically prohibits a judge while holding
his judicial office from campaigning for a non-judicial post. But the
Canon has been violated on occasion, sometimes in spirit and sometimes
in the letter. The most notorious of the violators of the letter of the
Canon was former Senator Joseph McCarthy, who early in his career
indicated his insensitivity to ethical considerations by running for a
partisan office (the United States Senate) while holding a judicial po-
sition.30
Turning to the subject of activities which do not in themselves even
arguably "demean" or "exploit", we find a fairly lively debate.
Judge Irving Kaufman and Delmar Karlen, as officers of the Insti-
tute of Judicial Administration, recently authored a warning against
judicial monasticism:
In view of the growing concern about outside activities of judges, we think it
important to reaffirm the principle that judges should not become monastic, but should
continue to work with 'the organized bar and the law schools of this country in
efforts to improve the administration of justice. Judicial reform is no more a sport
for the weak-hearted than it is for the short-winded. If judges should falter now in
face of the agitation of the moment, much of the motive power behind court reform
would be lost.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics deserve careful study and possible revision, but the
task should be undertaken calmly and deliberately, with full realization of the great
value of judicial participation in the betterment of the law and legal institutions.3 1
Dean Acheson even more recently took the opposite view in testi-
mony before a United States Senate Judicial Subcommittee chaired by
Senator Ervin.
30. State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d 504 (1946).
31. Kaufman & Karlen, Inst. of Jud. Admin. Rep., No. 4, at 1 (1969).
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(2) Judicial officers participating in nonjudicidal work or organizations. This prac-
tice should be flatly prohibited. The most important extrajudicial assignments distract
from judicial tasks, and lesser ones may bring involvement in controversies detracting
from judicial impartiality and aloofness0 2
On this score, I side with Kaufman and Karlen. The American ju-
diciary is not and should not become a grey bureaucracy completely
remote from the life and the problems of the nation. It is a third and
coordinate branch of government-vital to the health and growth of
this nation. Most of the "outside activity" of judges is concerned with
writing, lecturing, teaching or learning about matters directly related
to the law.
From 18 years on the Bench, I recall the Appellate Judges' Seminar
at New York University Law School as the richest single learning ex-
perience. The faculty in 1958 when I attended was headed by Mr.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. This year under the impact of criticism
of "outside activities" of judges, he gave up his association with the
Seminar. To me this is a source of genuine regret. That Seminar was
not "outside activity"; it was the finest kind of direct judicial activity.
For it represented judges learning from other judges and imparting to
other judges what experience had taught them.
Legal writing, lecturing, teaching and studying are antidotes to ju-
dicial atrophy. So long as time spent on them does not interfere with the
judge's proper performance of his direct judicial duties, I think it is in
the public interest to encourage them. I have never known a judge who
could be rated substandard in judicial output because of "outside" lec-
turing, writing or teaching. In the history of American law the "great"
judges made many such contributions. Some, like Holmes and Cardozo,
are remembered and valued in the law as much for their "outside" legal
writing as for their opinions. Lawyers in private practice rarely do much
writing. Without intending any offense, the notion of leaving legal writ-
ing exclusively to law professors leaves me aghast.
I had no objection to the Judicial Conference rule, now suspended,a'
banning compensation for these activities without prior approval by the
circuit judicial council. But, as demonstrated above, the judge with
larceny in his heart is likely to find a much less clumsy mechanism for
his purpose than any of these.
Canon 23 currently contains a mandate to judges to share with ap-
propriate authority what experience has taught about the defects of the
judicial process and the remedies for them.
32. Acheson, Removing the Shadow Cast on the Courts, 55 A.B.A J. 919, 920 (1962).
33. See note 4, supra.
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Canon 23. Legislation
A judge has exceptional opportunity to observe the operation of statutes, especially
those relating to practice, and to ascertain whether they tend to impede the just
disposition of controversies; and he may well contribute to the public interest by
advising those having authority to remedy defects of procedure, of the result of his
observation and experience.
Canon 31 contains this sanction for the judge's writing, lecturing or
teaching:
He may properly act as . . . lecturer upon or instruct in law, or write upon the
subject, and accept compensation therefor, if such course does not interfere with the
due performance of his judicial duties, and is not forbidden by some positive provi-
sion of law.
In my view whatever changes are made in the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, neither of these should be substantially altered.
I differ also with Mr. Acheson's blanket condemnation of Presidential
appointment of members of the Supreme Court to commissions which are
assigned to explore and report on great national problems. While I agree
with his comment on the inappropriateness of Justice Jackson's assign-
ment as Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials, I feel quite differently
about legislative prohibition of all such assignments. On this question I
told Senator Ervin's committee:
I think that it would be highly undesirable to have legislative provisions which
would have had the effect of prohibiting Mr. Justice Roberts' chairmanship of the
Pearl Harbor Commission, or Chief Justice Warren's chairmanship of the commission
which investigated the assassination of President Kennedy. Both of these events in-
volved national tragedies of historic magnitude which left in their wake many fears
and doubts on the part of the American people. There was a great need for the ab-
solute maximum of public confidence in the probity, courage and intelligence of
those who would conduct the inquiries. I do not feel that eliminating from consid-
eration the nine men who, at least hopefully, have been chosen from the entire
country with these qualities primarily in mind would be a sound approach to this
sort of historic problem.34
A JUDGE'S DECISION SHOULD REFLECT THE LAW AS
His KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIENCE HOLD IT To BE,
AND NOT THE PRESSURES OF THE MOMENT,
WHETHER FROM PREss OR POLITICS
OR PUBLIC PASSION
Canon 20. Influence of Decision Upon the Development
of the Law
A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to
particular instances, that ours is a government of law and not of men, and that he
34. Letter from Judge George Edwards to Senator Sam Ervin, Jr., June 24, 1969.
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violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what
he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the
general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may become a prec-
edent unsettling accepted principles and may have detrimental consequences beyond
the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with a due regard to the
integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository
of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.
If we do not start with recognizing the sometimes ignored fact that
judges are men and subject to all the problems of the human condition,
we miss the essence of the matter. The central problem of judicial
ethics really is how judges can speak for the community conscience-
state or national-rather than exclusively for their own. The unspoken
presumptions which underlie some comment on this topic are that judges
(or the best ones) were somehow created out of nothing, with no ties to
the past, and that they live in a vacuum or perhaps in some sort of
present-day monastery where the impact of present-day life is completely
absent. The notion is that judges thus can approach each case without a
background of prior experience, prior knowledge, and prior opinion
(whether termed prejudice or wisdom). Such presumptions would seem to
be destroyed by the mere statement of them.
Nonetheless, most people would, I believe, be inclined to say that
ideally a judge should know nothing whatsoever about any piece of
litigation which comes before him for decision. Actually, of course, this
is an impossibility for any human being. And our system of justice
makes it seem that we really deliberately plan to have decision-making
done by people who come closer to knowing the most, rather than the
least about all sorts of litigation problems which may come before them.
America is probably better satisfied with its judges of general jurisdic-
tion in rural counties than any other group in the judiciary. Yet in
most states of the union, these judges are elected. Almost invariably
such judges grew up in the rural county where they hold office, and
invariably they know not only something, but a great deal about the
background of every single piece of litigation within their jurisdiction.
My own trial court experience has been entirely in a metropolitan
area, the county of 3 million plus where Detroit is located. And yet, I
think that in at least 75% of the cases which I tried as a Circuit Court
judge in Wayne County, I either knew one or both of the lawyers, or
one or both of the litigants, or a good deal about the nature of the
controversy before it reached my court. If I had sought to disqualify
myself because of such prior knowledge or acquaintance, I could not
possibly have performed my duties as a judicial officer in Wayne
County, and neither could any of my brethren.
Not only is it both impossible (and undesirable) for a judge to bring
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a void of knowledge about the facts of life of his community to the
Bench with him, it is likewise impossible for him to come there without
a deep, rich and potent background of association with people and
forces in our society.
The family, the home, the neighborhood, the school, job, marriage,
military experience, travel, friends, avocations-all inevitably become a
part of the judge, just as they do of other men. No judge can ever
really disassociate himself from his origin, his history and his present
life. Nor should he try. Even a reaction against or specific rejection of
some aspect of his background is evidence of the fact that the influence
is there--one to be reckoned with.
Does this mean that for me the adage "Ours is a society of laws, not
of men" has no validity? Not at all. Like most quotable adages, this
is an overstatement-but it certainly has much truth in it. No thoughtful
judge can avoid the knowledge that he must live with two consciences.
In his private life, in his individual voting, in his personal speech and
writing, he expresses his own personal convictions. But in his judicial
function, he must also seek to super-impose on his own conscience the
conscience of his state or country as it has been expressed in written law.
Certainly there are occasions for all of us when the personal conscience
and the public conscience are at odds. Eighteen years on trial and
appellate benches has convinced me that mandatory sentences are funda-
mentally wrong. If society is to succeed in "correcting" criminal of-
fenders, the sentence given must be related to the offender and not
solely to the offense. The federal criminal law, however, contains many
mandatory sentences. I have spoken and written against mandatory
sentences. But on the Bench I have no right to substitute my private
conviction for the duly adopted law of the land.
In private practice I represented a number of silicosis victims (or
their widows) in industrial compensation claims. The statutory scheme
in Michigan at the time placed a $6,000 limitation upon a claim for
total disability or death caused by this disease. Acquaintance with the
situation of the victims or their widows and children left me appalled
by the utter inadequacy of the remedy. Total disability or death bene-
fits for victims of other industrial hazards were compensated at a some-
what better rate.
Subsequently, in the Supreme Court of Michigan, I sat with the
court in hearing an appeal where the $6,000 silicosis limitation was at-
tacked on equal protection grounds. The statutory intent of the limitation
provision was clear. The power of the state legislature to attack by
remedial legislation one or several evils in a particular field without
having to attack all or provide the same remedy for each had been re-
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peatedly upheld. A contrary rule would seriously restrict the power of
the legislative branch to fashion remedial legislation. I wrote the opinion
of the court denying the appeal. 5
This, of course, is nothing new. Many men from many different back-
grounds constitute the judiciary of this country. Though they see it
through different eyes, each in his own way seeks the goal of "equal
justice under law."
Occasionally it is suggested that a judge with a particular background
should be rejected for appointment or election, or if on the Bench,
should not sit on a particular issue.
A decade ago I heard it suggested that a judge who is a devout
Catholic should not consider First Amendment cases concerning the
establishment of religion. Should such cases then be assigned only to
devout Baptists or Episcopalians-or perhaps to atheists?
More recently I heard a lawyer strongly imply that Justice Marshall
ought to disqualify himself in civil rights cases and that Justice Gold-
berg similarly should have disqualified himself in labor cases. It re-
minded me of the experience of one of my colleagues on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Wade H. McCree,
Jr.
Judge McCree was assigned some years ago in the Michigan Circuit
Court to try a suit for reformation of a land deed. When the case was
called the lawyer for the plaintiff directed Judge McCree's attention to
the obvious fact that this lawyer's client was white, while the de-
fendant was black and so was the judge. He suggested that Judge McCree
would prefer not to sit. Judge McCree replied:
If your premise is correct, any white judge would be disqualified on the same
ground. So far as I know all 17 of my colleagues are white. Now if you would care
to seek information from them as to whether in fact any of them have a higher per-
centage of Negroid ancestry than I have Caucasoid ancestry and you find one better
qualified on this ground, I would be glad to step aside in his favor.
Perhaps it is not necessary to add that the lawyer withdrew his
suggestion.
Part of the strength of this country is its diversity. To suggest that
that diversity should not be represented on the Bench is to deny an
important aspect of the American heritage. Even in relation to judges,
the melting pot works, as Justice Cardozo's eloquence tells us:
The training of the judge, if coupled with what is styled the judicial temperament,
will help in some degree to emancipate him from the suggestive power of individual
dislikes and prepossessions. It will help to broaden the group to which his subconscious
35. Gauthier v. Campbell, Wyant & Canon Foundry Co., 360 Alich. 510, 104 N.W2d
182 (1960).
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loyalties are due. Never will these loyalties be utterly extinguished while human naturo
is what it is. We may wonder sometimes how from the play of all these forces of
individualism, there can come anything coherent, anything but chaos and the void.
Those are the moments in which we exaggerate the elements of difference. In the end
there emerges somthing which has a composite shape and truth and order. It has been
said that "History, like mathematics, is obliged to assume that eccentricities more
or less balance each other, so that something remains constant at last." The like is
true of the work of courts. The eccentricities of judges balance one another. One
judge looks at problems from the point of view of history, another from that of
philosophy, another from that of social utility, one is a formalist, another a latitu-
dinarian, one is timorous of change, another dissatisfied with the present; out of the
attrition of diverse minds there is beaten something which has a constancy and uni-
formity and average value greater than its component elements. 30
Years ago (but after six years in the judicial melting pot and in a
state trial court context) I drafted what I termed-
A JUDGE'S PRAYER
I hope I will always be impressed with the enormous power vested in the position
I hold over the property and, more importantly, the lives of people.
I hope I will never let myself become arbitrary or calloused in the exercise of it.
I hope that I will always remember that that power is placed there by the people;
can, thank God, be withdrawn by them, and that our law is not above the people but
for them and of them.
I hope that I will always remember how I felt as a young lawyer the first time I
walked into a courtroom and looked up at the Bench.
I hope that I will always try to give the younger members of the Bar the sym-
pathy, courtesy, understanding and help that their profession merits.
I hope that I always remember that at least one great trial judge has said that any
impatient judge should be impeached, and (whether we accept that drastic measure or
not) it should serve to remind me that patience is a virtue more needed on the
Bench than in any other occupation.
I hope that I shall always remember that the greatest job of the courts is to deal
with people in trouble and that I shall always endeavor to handle criminal cases, di-
vorce cases and matters involving children with at least the time and interest and
concern with which the court traditionally deals with property disputes.
I hope I can always remember that the three most important words to anyone
interested in learning are "I don't know" and that I will never be too afraid or
embarrassed to use them.
I hope I shall always remember that the people look to the courts to defend their
fundamental freedoms and that I have no right ever to sacrifice one iota of those
rights for the least significant person because of the ranting of demagogues or the
pressures of press or politics.
I hope I shall always remember to respect the office I hold and require others to do
likewise in my courtroom.
I hope in the midst of tragedy and pathos with which the courts deal I will be
able to maintain some sense of humor.
I hope I will never take myself too seriously, and that I will be able to laugh
36. B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 176-77 (1921) (footnote omitted).
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with the parties who subsequently point out to me how often I have failed in these
ambitions.
Perhaps Micah long ago provided the complete formula for judicial
ethics, "What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to
love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?"17
APPENDIX A
Canons of Judicial Ethics
ANCIENT PRECEDENTS.
"And I charged your judges at that time, saying Hear the causes between your
brethren, and judge righteously between every man and his brother, and the stranger
that is with him.
"Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; but ye shall hear the small as well
as the great; ye shall not be afraid of the face of man; for the judgment is God's;
and the cause that is too hard for you, bring it unto me, and I will hear it.--Deu-
teronomy, I, 16-17.
"Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons, neither take a
gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righ-
teous."--Deuteronomy, XVI, 19.
"We will not make any justiciaries, constables, sheriffs or bailiffs, but from those
who understand the law of the realm and are well disposed to observe it.-Magna
Charta, XLV.
"Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere not jus dare; to interpret
law, and not to make law, or give law." ...
"Judges ought to be more learned than witty; more reverend than plausible; and
more advised than confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion and proper
virtue." ...
"Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice; and an over speak-
iag judge is no well-tuned cymbal. It is no grace to a judge first to find that which
he might have heard in due time from the Bar, or to show quickness of conceit in
37. Micah 6:8.
a These Canons, to and including Canon 34, were adopted by the American Bar Associa-
tion at its Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on July 9, 1924.
The Committee of the Association which prepared the Canons was appointed in 1922, and
composed of the following: William H. Taft, District of Columbia, Chairman; Leslie C.
Cornish, Maine; Robert von Moschzisker, Pennsylvania; Charles A. Boston, New York; and
Garret IV. McEnerney, California. George Sutherland, of Utah, originally a member of the
Committee, retired and was succeeded by Mr. McEnerney. In 1923, Frank M. Angellotti, of
California, took the place of Mr. McEnerney.
Canons 28 and 30 were amended at the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting, Grand Rapids, Mich-
igan, August 30-September 1, 1933. Canon 28 was further amended at the Seventy-Third An-
nual Meeting, Washington, D. C., September 20, 1950. Canons 35 and 36 were adopted at
the Sixtieth Annual Meeting, at Kansas City, Missouri, September 30, 1937. Canon 35 was
amended at San Francisco, Calif., Sept. 1952.
Reprinted with permission.
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cutting off evidence or counsel too short; or to prevent information by questions
though pertinent."
"The place of justice is a hallowed place; and therefore not only the Bench, but
the foot pace and precincts and purprise thereof ought to be preserved without
scandal and corruption." . .- Bacon's Essay "Of Judicature."
PREAMBLE.
In addition to the Canons for Professional Conduct of Lawyers which it has for-
mulated and adopted, the American Bar Association, mindful that the character and
conduct of a judge should never be objects of indifference, and that declared ethical
standards tend to become habits of life, deems it desirable to set forth its views
respecting those principles which should govern the personal practice of members
of the judiciary in the administration of their office. The Association accordingly
adopts the following Canons, the spirit of which it suggests as a proper guide and
reminder for judges, and as indicating what the people have a right to expect from
them.
1. RELATIONS OF THE JUDICIARY.
The assumption of the office of judge casts upon the incumbent duties in respect
to his personal conduct which concern his relation to the state and its inhabitants,
the litigants before him, the principles of law, the practitioners of law in his court,
and the witnesses, jurors and attendants who aid him in the administration of its
functions.
2. THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
Courts exist to promote justice, and thus to serve the public interest. Their admin-
istration should be speedy and careful. Every judge should at all times be alert in his
rulings and in the conduct of the business of the court, so far as he can, to make it
useful to litigants and to the community. He should avoid unconsciously falling
into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the
courts for the litigants.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS.
It is the duty of all judges in the United States to support the federal Constitution
and that of the state whose laws they administer; in so doing, they should fearlessly
observe and apply fundamental limitations and guarantees.
4. AvoDANCE OF IMPROPRIETY.
A judge's official conduct should be free from impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety; he should avoid infractions of law; and his personal behavior, not only
upon the Bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday
life, should be beyond reproach.
5. ESSENTIAL CONDUCT.
A judge should be temperate, attentive, patient, impartial, and, since he is to
administer the law and apply it to the facts, he should be studious of the principles
of the law and diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the facts.
6. INDUSTRY.
A judge should exhibit an industry and application commensurate with the duties
imposed upon him.
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7. PRo'PTNrss.
A judge should be prompt in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing
that the time of litigants, jurors and attorneys is of value and that habitual lack
of punctuality on his part justifies dissatisfaction with the administration of the
business of the court.
8. COURT ORGANMTION.
A judge should organize the court with a view to the prompt and convenient dis-
patch of its business and he should not tolerate abuses and neglect by clerks, and
other assistants who are sometimes prone to presume too much upon his good natured
acquiescence by reason of friendly association with him.
It is desirable too, where the judicial system permits, that he should cooperate with
other judges of the same court, and in other courts, as members of a single judicial
system, to promote the more satisfactory administration of justice.
9. CONSIDERATION FOR JURORS AND OTHERS.
A judge should be considerate of jurors, witnesses and others in attendance upon
the court.
10. COURTESY AND CrirrY.
A judge should be courteous to counsel, especially to those who are young and
inexperienced, and also to all others appearing or concerned in the administration
of justice in the court.
He should also require, and, so far as his power extends, enforce on the part of
clerks, court officers and counsel civility and courtesy to the court and to jurors, wit-
nesses, litigants and others having business in the court.
11. UNPROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT OF ATTORNEYS AND COUNSEL.
A judge should utilize his opportunities to criticise and correct unprofessional con-
duct of attorneys and counsellors, brought to his attention; and, if adverse comment
is not a sufficient corrective, should send the matter at once to the proper investi-
gating and disciplinary authorities.
12. APPOINTEES OF THE JUDICIARY AND THERm COiPENSATION.
Trustees, receivers, masters, referees, guardians and other persons appointed by
a judge to aid in the administration of justice should have the strictest probity and
impartiality and should be selected with a view solely to their character and fitness.
The power of making such appointments should not be exercised by him for personal
or partisan advantage. He should not permit his appointments to be controlled by
others than himself. He should also avoid nepotism and undue favoritism in his
appointments.
While not hesitating to fix or approve just amounts, he should be most scrupulous
in granting or approving compensation for the services or charges of such appointees
to avoid excessive allowances, whether or not excepted to or complained of. He cannot
rid himself of this responsibility by the consent of counsel.
13. KINsHIP OR INFLUENCE.
A judge should not act in a controversy where a near relative is a party; he should
not suffer his conduct to justify the impression that any person can improperly influ-
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ence him or unduly enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by the kinship, rank, posi-
tion or influence of any party or other person.
14. INDEPENDENCE.
A judge should not be swayed by partisan demands, public clamor or considerations
of personal popularity or notoriety, nor by apprehensive of unjust criticism.
15. INTERFERENCE IN CONDUCT o TRIAL.
A judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and
prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, but he should bear
in mind that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in the examination
of witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who
are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent
the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect
thereto.
Conversation between the judge and counsel in court is often necessary, but the
judge should be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits
of the dispute between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. In addressing
counsel, litigants, or witnesses, he should avoid a controversial manner or tone.
He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to clarify his
mind as to their positions, and he should not be tempted to the unnecessary display
of learning or a premature judgment.
16. Ex PARTE APPLICATIONS.
A judge should discourage ex parte hearings of applications for injunctions and
receiverships where the order may work detriment to absent parties; he should act
upon such ex parte applications only where the necessity for quick action is clearly
shown; if this be demonstrated, then he should endeavor to counteract the effect
of the absence of opposing counsel by a scrupulous cross-examination and investiga-
tion as to the facts and the principles of law on which the application is based, grant-
ing relief only when fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands
it. He should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action
of defendants and should not be granted lightly or inadvisedly. One applying for
such relief must sustain the burden of showing clearly its necessity and this burden
is increased in the absence of the party whose freedom of action is sought to be
restrained even though only temporarily.
17. Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS.
A judge should not permit private interviews, arguments or communications de-
signed to influence his judicial action, where interests to be affected thereby are not
represented before him, except in cases where provision is made by law for ex parte
application.
While the conditions under which briefs of arguments are to be received are largely
matters of local rule or practice, he should not permit the contents of such brief
presented to him to be concealed from opposing counsel. Ordinarily all communica-
tions of counsel to the judge intended or calculated to influence action should be
made known to opposing counsel.
18. CONTINUANCES.
Delay in the administration of justice is a common cause of complaint; counsel
are frequently responsible for this delay. A judge, without being arbitrary or forcing
cases unreasonably or unjustly to trial when unprepared, to the detriment of parties,
may well endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to the
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public interest, to their own clients, and to the adverse party and his counsel, so as
to enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business before the court.
19. JUDICIAL. OPINIONS.
In disposing of controverted cases, a judge should indicate the reasons for his
action in an opinion showing that he has not disregarded or overlooked serious argu-
ments of counsel. He thus shows his full understanding of the case, avoids the sus-
picion of arbitrary conclusion, promotes confidence in his intellectual integrity and
may contribute useful precedent to the growth of the law.
It is desirable that Courts of Appeals in reversing cases and granting new trials
should so indicate their views on questions of law argued before them and necessarily
arising in the controversy that upon the new trial counsel may be aided to avoid
the repetition of erroneous positions of law and shall not be left in doubt by the
failure of the court to decide such questions.
But the volume of reported decisions is such and is so rapidly increasing that in
writing opinions which are to be published judges may well take this fact into con-
sideration, and curtail them accordingly, without substantially departing from the
principles stated above.
It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of last resort should
use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion and the consequent
influence of judicial decision. A judge should not yield to pride of opinion or value
more highly his individual reputation than that of the court to which he should
be loyal. Except in case of conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental prin-
ciple, dissenting opinions should be discouraged in courts of last resort.
20. INFLUENcE oF DEcIsIONs UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TIlE LAW.
A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to par-
ticular instances, that ours is a government of law and not of men, and that he
violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do
what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards
the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may become a
precedent unsettling accepted principles and may have detrimental consequences
beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office With a due regard
to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depos-
itary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.
21. IDIOSYNCRACIES AND INCONSISTENCIES.
Justice should not be moulded by the individual idiosyncracies of those who ad-
minister it. A judge should adopt the usual and expected method of doing justice,
and not seek to be extreme or peculiar in his judgments, or spectacular or sensational
in the conduct of the court. Though vested with discretion in the imposition of mild
or severe sentences he should not compel persons brought before him to submit
to some humiliating act or discipline of his own devising, without authority of law,
because he thinks it will have a beneficial corrective influence.
In imposing sentence he should endeavor to conform to a reasonable standard of
punishment and should not seek popularity or publicity either by exceptional severity
or undue leniency.
22. R.vinw.
In order that a litigant may secure the full benefit of the right of review accorded
to him by law, a trial judge should scrupulously grant to the defeated party oppor-
tunity to present the questions arising upon the trial exactly as they arose, were
presented, and decided, by full and fair bill of exceptions or otherwse; any failure
19691
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
in this regard on the part of the judge is peculiarly worthy of condemnation because
the wrong done may be irremediable.
23. LEGISLATION.
A judge has exceptional opportunity to observe the operation of statutes, especially
those relating to practice, and to ascertain whether they tend to impede the just
disposition of controversies; and he may well contribute to the public interest by
advising those having authority to remedy defects of procedure, of the result of his
observation and experience.
24. INCONSISTENT OBLIGATIONS.
A judge should not accept inconsistent duties; nor incur obligations, pecuniary
or otherwise, which will in any way interfere or appear to interfere with his devotion
to the expeditious and proper administration of his official functions.
25. BUSINESS PROMOTIONS AND SOLICITATIONS FOR CIIARITY.
A judge should avoid giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing
the power or prestige of his office to persuade or coerce others to patronize or con-
tribute, either to the success of private business ventures, or to charitable enterprises.
He should, therefore, not enter into such private business, or pursue such a course
of conduct, as would justify such suspicion, nor use the power of his office or the
influence of his name to promote the business interests of others; he should not
solicit for charities, nor should he enter into any business relation which, in the
normal course of events reasonably to be expected, might bring his personal interest
into conflict with the impartial performance of his official duties.
26. PERSONAL INVESTMENTS AND RELATIONS.
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which
are apt to be involved in litigation in the court; and, after his accession to the Bench,
he should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient
to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should,
so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend
to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent
his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties.
He should not utilize information coming to him in a judicial capacity for purposes
of speculation; and it detracts from the public confidence in his integrity and the
soundness of his judicial judgment for him at any time to become a speculative
investor upon the hazard of a margin.
27. EXECUTORSHIPS AND TRUSTEESHIPS.
While a judge is not disqualified from holding executorships or trusteeships, he
should not accept or continue to hold any fiduciary or other position if the holding
of it would interfere or seem to interfere with the proper performance of his judicial
duties, or if the business interests of those represented require investments in enter-
prises that are apt to come before him judicially, or to be involved in questions of law
to be determined by him.
28. PARTISAN POLITICS.b
While entitled to entertain his personal views of political questions, and while not
required to surrender his rights or opinions as a citizen, it is inevitable that suspicion
of being warped by political bias will attach to a judge who becomes the active
promoter of the interests of one political party as against another. He should avoid
b As amended August 31, 1933 and September 20, 1950.
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making political speeches, making or soliciting payment of assessments or contribu-
tions to party funds, the public endorsement of candidates for political office and
participation in party conventions.
He should neither accept nor retain a place on any party committee nor act as party
leader, nor engage generally in partisan activities.
Where, however, it is necessary for judges to be nominated and elected as candi-
dates of a political party, nothing herein contained shall prevent the judge from
attending or speaking at political gatherings, or from maling contributions to the
campaign funds of the party that has nominated him and seeks his election or re-
election.
29. SELF-INTEREST.
A judge should abstain from performing or taking part in any judicial act in which
his personal interests are involved. If he has personal litigation in the court of which
he is judge, he need not resign his judgeship on that account, but he should, of course,
refrain from any judicial act in such a controversy.
30. CANDIDACY FOR OFFCE.C
A candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer others to make for
him, promises of conduct in office which appeal to the cupidity or prejudices of the
appointing or electing power; he should not announce in advance his conclusions
of law on disputed issues to secure class support, and he should do nothing while a
candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will administer his office with
bias, partiality or improper discrimination.
While holding a judicial position he should not become an active candidate either
at a party primary or at a general election for any office other than a judicial office.
If a judge should decide to become a candidate for any office not judicial, he should
resign in order that it cannot be said that he is using the power or prestige of his
judicial position to promote his own candidacy or the success of his party.
If a judge becomes a candidate for any judicial office, he should refrain from all
conduct which might tend to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is using the power
or prestige of his judicial position to promote his candidacy or the success of his
party.
He should not permit others to do anything in behalf of his candidacy which would
reasonably lead to such suspicion.
31. PRIVATE LAW PRAcricE.
In many states the practice of law by one holding judicial position is forbidden. In
superior courts of general jurisdiction, it should never be permitted. In inferior courts
in some states, it is permitted because the county or municipality is not able to pay
adequate living compensation for a competent judge. In such cases one who practices
law is in a position of great delicacy and must be scrupulously careful to avoid con-
duct in his practice whereby he utilizes or seems to utilize his judicial position to
further his professional success.
He should not practise in the court in which he is a judge, even when presided over
by another judge, or appear therein for himself in any controversy.
If forbidden to practise law, he should refrain from accepting any professional
employment while in office.
He may properly act as arbitrator or lecture upon or instruct in law, or write
upon the subject, and accept compensation therefor, if such course does not interfere
c As amended August 31, 1933.
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with the due performance of his judicial duties, and is not forbidden by some positive
provision of law.
32. GIFTS AND FAVORS.
A judge should not accept any presents or favors from litigants, or from lawyers
practising before him or from others whose interests are likely to be submitted to
him for judgment.
33. SOCIAL RELATIONS.
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that a judge should
live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as reasonable attention to
the completion of his work will permit, he continue to mingle in social intercourse,
and that he should not discontinue his interest in or appearance at meetings of
members of the Bar. He should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before
him be particularly careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to awaken
the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element
in influencing his judicial conduct.
34. A SUMMARY or JUDICIAL OBLIGATION.
In every particular his conduct should be above reproach. He should be conscien-
tious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of pub-
lic clamor, regardless of public praise, and indifferent to private political or partisan
influences; he should administer justice according to law, and deal with his appoint-
ments as a public trust; he should not allow other affairs or his private interests to
interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his judicial duties, nor should
he administer the office for the purpose of advancing his personal ambitions or increas-
ing his popularity.
35. IMPROPER PUBLICIZING OF COURT PROCEEDINGS.d
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The
taking of photographs in the court room, during sessions of the court or recesses
between sessions, and the broadcasting or televising of court proceedings detract from
the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract participants and witnesses in giving
testimony, and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public
and should not be permitted.
Provided that this restriction shall not apply to the broadcasting or televising, under
the supervision of the court, of such portions of naturalization proceedings (other
than the interrogation of applicants) as are designed and carried out exclusively as
a ceremony for the purpose of publicly demonstrating in an impressive manner the
essential dignity and the serious nature of naturalization.
36. CONDUCT OF COURT PROCEEDINGS. e
Proceedings in court should be so conducted as to reflect the importance and
seriousness of the inquiry to ascertain the truth.
The oath should be administered to witnesses in a manner calculated to impress
them with the importance and solemnity of their promise to adhere to the truth.
Each witness should be sworn separately and impressively at the bar or the court,
and the clerk should be required to make a formal record of the administration of
the oath, including the name of the witness.
d Adopted September 30, 1937; amended September 15, 1952 and February 5, 1963.
e Adopted September 30, 1937.
